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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

19 May 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Verification Panel Working Group

SUBJECT : Comments on State Department Draft,
"SALT -- Public Statements About
US Verification Capabilities"

1. The draft paper appears to explore the appropriate options adequately and evenly. With the exception of the few details outlined below, CIA believes the paper is acceptable.

2. We strongly recommend the use of the word monitor instead of verify wherever possible because we believe it is a better description of the role of "unilateral means".

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5. On page 10, in the discussion of Alternative C, we see real problems in both forms of qualitative statements. In the first instance, we do not believe that confidence levels ought to be expressed quantitatively with respect to specific target types, such as in the example cited for "our ability to count numbers of ICBMs". Such expressions could lead to discussion of different kinds of ICBMs, which would in turn necessitate discussion of

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Instead, such statements should aim at stressing our confidence, per se,

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
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that we have identified all ICBMs, ABMs, and other facilities covered by the agreements. Secondly, in developing more graphic statements, great care would be needed to avoid making claims which may be misleading or disprovable. We do regard Alternative C as a viable option, but would emphasize that any statements developed about the effectiveness of "national technical means" will require careful formulation in light of the disadvantage listed for that alternative.

6. In the consideration of Alternative D, on pages 12 and 13, we would note that although the Soviets are already aware of some of the types of systems and of the numbers of missions, the disadvantages cited would be heightened if other characteristics of the systems and their mission capabilities were revealed.

7. From among the Alternatives, we clearly prefer A or B to C and D because we believe the arguments in the paper against the latter clearly outweigh the possible benefits.




GEORGE W. ALLEN
Special Assistant for
Strategic Arms Talks, OSR

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Jack Maury
OLC

Per Bruce Clarke's phonecon, herewith is a copy of the draft prepared by State on "SALT-Public Statements About US Verification Capabilities". Also attached is a copy of our memo to the Verification Panel Working Group forwarding our comments on the State draft. We'll keep in touch as developments along this line unfold.


G.W. Allen
Special Assistant for
Strategic Arms Talks, OSR

19 May 72
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